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NOTES
TAXATION OF STOCK DIVIDENDS UNDER THE
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
UNTIL 1954 the taxation of stock dividends under the federal income
tax was uncertain. In 1920 the Supreme Court held in Eisner v.
Macomber' that stock dividends which did not alter the taxpayer's pro-
portional interest in the assets of the corporation were not taxable in-
come. In 1936, Koshland v. Helvering held that a stock dividend
which gave the shareholder an interest in the corporation different from
that which he owned prior to the dividend was taxable income, regard-
less of whether his proportional interest was changed. Thus, for a
number of years the "proportional interest" and "different in kind" tests
determined the taxability of stock dividends. The unpredictable and
sometimes inequitable results which they produced,' however, prompted
the enactment of section 305 of the 1954 Code,4 which provides that stock
dividends do not represent taxable income unless they are issued in lieu
of dividends on preferred stock for the current or preceding year or
unless the shareholder has an option to receive other property or cash
in place of the stock dividend."
The "proportional interest" test, rejected by the 1954 Code, has been
revived by the Treasury to tax stock dividends under the estate tax when
such dividends have been declared on stock transferred in contemplation
of death," on gift stock later placed in a joint tenancy with the donorJ
'zz U.S. 189 (1920).
2 98 U.S. 441 (936).
' See Dean, The Stock Dividend, 3 z TAXES 586 (1954); Lowndes The Taxation of
Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 147 (1947).
' Under the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. x, § 115(f) (1), 53 Stat. 47, a distribution
of stock by a corporation to its shareholders was not treated as a dividend to the extent
that it did not constitute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment. Under section 15 (f) (i) the tax of a given stock dividend was determined
by applying the proportional interest theory of Eisner v. Macomber, supra note i, as
modified by Koshland v. Helvering, supra note 2, and subsequent court decisions.
' Section 305 is designed to postpone the tax on stock dividends until income is
realized through their sale or other taxable disposition, without regard to whether or
not a particular shareholder's interest in the corporation, proportional or otherwise, has
been varied. The tax loss resulting from a subsequent taxable disposition of the dividend
shares at capital gains rates is mitigated by allocating the adjusted basis of the old
stock between the old and new stock. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 307(a).
'Estate of Delia Crawford McGehee, 28 T.C. 412 (957), rev'd, 26o F.zd 8x8
(5 th Cir. x958).
'Tuck v. United States, 17z F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
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and on stock which is included in the decedent's estate on the alternate
valuation date.'
In Estate of Delia Crawford McGehee,9 the decedent transferred
by gift certain shares of stock in contemplation of death.10 Subsequent
to the transfer, but prior to her death, stock dividends representing the
capitalization of current earnings were declared on the transferred shares
and issued to the donees. 11 The Tax Court12 included the value of the
stock dividends in the decedent's gross estate 3 on the theory that the
gift of stock in contemplation of death transferred the decedent's en-
tire proportional interest in the corporation and that stock dividends
declared after the transfer were but a part of the proportional interest
transferred. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,'" however,
traced the stock dividends to corporate profits earned after the transfer
and reversed the Tax Court, holding that the dividends representing a
capitalization of income earned subsequent to the date of transfer were
not a proportionate part of the corporate assets at the time of the gift
and therefore could not be regarded as part of the transfer. The court
added by way of dictum, however, that, "Cases involving stock splits or
8 Estate of John Schlosser, 32 T.C. No. z5 (April 30, 1959).
S28 T.C. 41z (1957), revd, 26o F.2d 8i (5th Cir. 1958).
"' Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 8i1(c), ch. 3, 53 Stat. Ia.
This provision is substantially embodied in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2.035(a)
which provides: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property...
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth) ... in contemplation of death." Since 1954 the statute has
conclusively presumed that all transfers made more than three years before the trans-
feror's death were not made in contemplation of death. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ zo35(b).
' The transfers in question took place in 1947, 1948, and x949. The corporation
had never declared a cash dividend, but from 1941 through 1949 had followed a policy
of capitalizing current earnings by a distribution of stock dividends.
12 Estate of Delia Crawford McGehee, 28 T.C. 42z, 4x5 (1957).
"The regulations provide that the transferred property interest includible in the
gross estate is to be valued on the date of the decedent's death or on the alternate valua-
tion date. Treas. Reg. § zo.zo3I-1(b) (1958). See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ z031,
203z. Any increase in the value of the property resulting from improvements or addi-
tions by the transferee is not considered in determining the value of the gross estate,
nor is income received subsequent to the transfer or property purchased with such income.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-I(e) (x958). For cases excluding cash dividends and other
income from the value of the transferred property, see Commissioner v. McDermott's
Estate, 22z F.2d 665 (7th Cir. i955)5 Commissioner v. Gidwitz's Estate, 196 F.zd
813 (Oth Cir. 1953) i Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.zd 739 (5th Cir. .949).
1, McGeee v. Commissioner, 26o F.2d 81g (sth Cir. 1958).
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stock dividends capitalizing corporate profits earned prior to the transfer
might require different treatment."' "
This dictum was applied in i959 in Tuck v. United States, " where
stock dividends were declared on shares the decedent had transferred by
gift to his wife. The original stock and the dividend shares were sub-
sequently placed in joint tenancy between the decedent and his wife.
Following his death the decedent's wife sought to exclude from his gross
estate that part of the value of the jointly held stock attributable to the
dividend shares she received while she was sole owner of the stock. She
contended that, under the McGehee case, the dividend shares originally
belonged to her.17  The court held, however, that the dividend shares
were taxable to the decendent's estate because it was not proved that they
represented a capitalization of profits earned after the transfer. 18
In Estate of John Schlosser,0 the executor elected to value the
decedent's estate on the alternate valuation date. 0 Subsequent to the
decedent's death, but prior to the alternate valuation date,2 ' an eight-per
cent stock dividend was declared and issued on shares of stock included
in the gross estate.12  The issuing corporation declared the stock divi-
25 1d. at 820.
18 172 F. Supp. 89o (N.D. Cal. 1959).
"'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 8.z(e), ch. 3, 53 Stat. 1z, substantially embodied in
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040, which requires that "the value of the gross estate shall
include the value of all property . . . to the extent of the interest therein held as joint
tenants by the decedent and any other person . . . except such part thereof as may be
shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have been received
or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth." See Treas. Reg. § 20.2040 (1958).
'
8 Treas. Reg. 20.2040-I(c)(s) (.958). Cash dividends and other income pro.
duced by gift property and later placed in joint tenancy are excluded as property origi-
nally belonging to another person. See Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463 ( 7 th
Cir. 195o). Accord, Ralph Owen Howard, 9 T.C. 1192 (1947).
10 32 T.C. No. 25 (April 30, 1959).
'
0 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §811(j), ch. 3, 53 Stat. 122, now INT. REV. CODE O
1954, § 2032. The statute permits the executor to elect to value all the property in-
cluded in the gross estate as of the date one year after the decedent's death, with the
exception that property distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of before
the end of the one-year period following death shall be valued as of the date of its
distribution, sale, exchange, or other disposition. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032 (1958).
Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the practice was termed the optional
method.
.o-The statute is interpreted as permitting the alternate valuation on the anniversary
of the decedents death. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(e) (x958). In the instant case,
where the decedent died on January 25, 1953, the alternate valuation date was January
25, 1954.
"The decedent held 10,394 shares of Sun Oil Co. common stock at his death. The
stock dividend added 831 shares to his holdings.
dends from current earnings,2 3 and, when the shares were issued, trans-
ferred from earned surplus to its capital account an amount equal to
the assigned value of the dividend shares. The Tax Court, finding
support in an administrative interpretation 4 of Section 2032 of the Code,
held that the shares received as stock dividends were taxable property
within the meaning of that section and the applicable regulations,25 and
upheld the Commissioner's determination that they be included in the
gross estate at their fair market value on the alternate valuation date.
The usual standard of valuation under the estate tax is the fair mar-
ket value of the property on the date of the decedent's death.26 During
the depression years, this standard produced extreme hardship where a
sudden decline in the market value of the taxable property following
the decedent's death reduced the value of his estate so that a sale of all
the property was sometimes necessary to pay the estate tax. To provide
some protection against the complete confiscation of estates under such
circumstances, 27 the alternate valuation method, which permits the execu-
tor to value the estate one year after the date of death, was authorized
by the Revenue Act of 1935.28
The Treasury Regulations29 interpreting this provision enumerated
several types of property and established standards for determining
their inclusion in the gross estate when the alternate valuation date was
23 On October 20, 1953, the directors announced that the dividend was to be issued
on December i5th to the shareholders of record on November 13 th. Each dividend share
was assigned a value of $65. The earnings for the year ending December 31, 1953,
exceeded the aggregate value of the stock and cash dividends during the year. Estate of
John Schlosser, 32 T.C. No. 25 (April 30, 1959).
2" Rev. Rul. 58-576, 1958-z CuM. BULL. 625, 6z6 provides: "The declaration of
the stock dividend after the decedent's death directly affects the value of the shares of
stock at the subsequent valuation date so that the decedent's shares of stock in the
corporation at the subsequent valuation date no longer reasonably represent the same
property interest in the corporation possessed by the decedent at the time of his death.
Such a dividend is 'included property' as that term is defined in section 20.2032-1 of the
regulations."
" Treas. Reg. § 2o.2o32-1 (d) (19 58)7-- Ato-ugl the court did not expressly accept
the "proportional interest" test, it cited with approval-Prof. Paul, who indicates that,
under Eisner v. Macomber, stock dividends declared during the alternate valuation
period should be included in the subsequent valuktion. Estate of John Schlosser, 3z
T.C. No. 25 (April 30, 1959). See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
1342 (-942).
"
6 Treas. Reg. §2o.2o 3 1-1(b) (1958).
27 See S. RE'. No. 1240, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. 9 (935).
'
5Revenue Act of 2926, § 302(j), added by ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1o22 (1935).
"Treas. Reg. 8o, § 11 (1937).
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elected. 0 The regulations applicable to corporate stock required that
all dividends received or accrued during the year following death be
included in the gross estate on the alternate valuation date."1
In Maass v. Higgins, 2 however, the Supreme Court reached a dif-
ferent conclusion as to the property includible in the gross estate on the
alternate valuation date. Section 302(j) of the Revenue Act of 1926
provided that the value of the gross estate should be determined one
year after the decedent's death by valuing at that time all the property
included in the gross estate on the date of the decendent's death.3 Under
the usual method of valuation, only those dividends accrued on the date
of the decedent's death are included in the gross estate. Since neither
the langauge of the statute nor the committee reports3 4 indicated a
congressional intention that different methods or different property be
considered when the alternate valuation date was elected, the Court
properly concluded that only those dividends accrued on the date of
death would be included in the estate on the alternate date, and those
dividends accrued after the decedent's death would be excluded.3 5
Following Maass v. Higgins,6 the Treasury amended the regula-
tions37 to provide for two classes of property interests. All property
interests existing at the decedent's death which formed a part of his
gross estate were "included property" and were taxed when the estate
"0 In general, the regulations asserted that property was composed of two distinct
elements-principal and right to income from the principal. More specifically, they
considered that all property interests included in the gross estate such as bonds, notes,
and those interests calling for payment of rents or royalties, embodied two valuation
elements: The value of the principal and the value of the right to receive interest or
rent for the use of the principal. Proceeding on this theory the regulations required that
all amounts received or accrued during the one-year period after death with respect to
property interests included in the gross estate at death, be included in the gross estate on
the alternate date. Treas. Reg. So, § ix 0937).
3" Ibid.
32 31Z U.S. 443 (1910.
" Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(j), added by ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1o22 (1935).
"' CONF. REP. No. 1885, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. io 0939) , reprinted 1939-I, part 2
CUM. BULL. 663-64. But see, 2 PAUL, op. cit. supra note z5, at 1335 n.7,
"Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443, 448-49 (941). The Court apparently sought
to avoid double taxation. Id. at 449. See 2 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 25, at 1336. A
clearer statement of the inclusion principle is found in Clark v. United States, 33 F. Supp.
216, 221 (D. Md. 594o), where the court held that ".... property which is to be valued
clearly must be that which was in existence at the date of the death of the decedent and
was then properly included in the gross estate."
'0312 U.S. 443 0940-
2 7 Treas. Reg. 8o, § 11 (1937), as amended, T.D. 5047, 1941-1 CUM. BULL. 425
(now Treas. Reg. § 20.20 3 2-1(d) (1958)).
was valued on the alternate valuation date, but all property interests
earned or accrued after the decedent's death were termed "excluded
property" and were not taxed on the alternate valuation date. The
amended regulations expressly covered dividends declared after the
decedent's death. They provided that, "Ordinary dividends out of
earnings and profits, whether in cash or shares of the corporation or in
other property.. ." were not to be included in the estate under the alter-
nate method. If, however, the dividends altered the value of the in-
cluded shares so that, on the alternate valuation date, they did not rea-
sonably represent the same included property as existed at the decedent's
death, the dividends were to be included in the gross state on the alter-
nate valuation date, except to the extent that they represented profits
earned after the decedent's death.38  The express language of the
amended regulations indicates that the McGehee "tracing" principle is
applicable and that stock dividends capitalizing corporate profits earned
after the decedent's death shall be excluded property when the alternate
valuation date is employed, 9 Revenue Ruling 58-57640 not withstanding.
Two theories, then, have emerged with regard to the taxation of
stock dividends under the estate tax. The McGehee4' and Tuck 42 cases
apply the "tracing" principle, and determine the taxability of stock
dividends by tracing them to the earnings from which they were de-
dared. If the shares can be attributed to a capitalization of current
earnings accruirig after the underlying shares were transferred, or after
the decedent's death if the alternate valuation method is used, they will
not be taxed under the estate tax.43 The utility of this method is im-
paired, however, by the difficult questions of fact and allocation which
it raises.44
The Tax Court and the Treasury, on the other hand, contend that
stock dividends which are not income should be taxed to the estate re-
28 Ibid.
" Treas. Reg. § 20.203 2-1 (d) (4) (.958), currently in effect, employ substantially
the same language as the amended regulations under the 1939 Code, and indicate that a
stock dividend would have to be declared entirely from accumulated earnings and profits
before its value could be included in the gross estate on the alternate valuation date.
"o Rev. Rul. 58-576, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 6z5.
,1 z6o F.2d 8x8 (5th Cir. 1958), reversing z8 T.C. 41z (1957).
42 172 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
"3 The method is analagous to the "Pennsylvania rule," which was formerly approved
by the Restatement of Trusts for allocating receipts from shares of stock between income
and principal beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT, TRUsTs § 236(a), comments c and h
(1935). The section has been amended to provide that all stock dividends constitute
principal. RESTATEMENT (Second), TRUsTS § z 3 6(b) (x959).
" RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 236(a), comment c (1935).
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gardless of their source. In establishing whether a given stock dividend
is income, two alternatives are available: the common-law principle of
Eisner v. Macomber',45 holding that stock dividends which fail to alter
the shareholder's proportional interest in the corporation are not income,
and the more recent expression of section 305,40 which provides that,
stock dividends are not income except when declared in discharge of
dividends on preferred shares for the current or preceding taxable year,
or when the shareholder is given the option of receiving cash or other
property in lieu of the dividend shares. To date, the Tax Court has
employed only the common-law "proportional interest" test, but its use
encourages litigation, and it is subject to the same myriad interpretations
as led to its replacement under the income tax.4 7
Perhaps it is impossible, on purely equitable grounds, to devise a
method of taxing stock dividends under the estate tax which would be
fair to all interests involved. In view of the difficulties inherent in the
use of the common-law "tracing" principle and "proportional-interest"
test, it would seem that the most practical solution to the problem could
be reached by applying to the particular stock dividend involved the
pragmatic test provided in section 305 of the Code and by including in
the decedent's gross estate on the applicable valuation date the value of
those dividend shares failing to qualify as income.
65 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
"INT. REv. CODE OF x954.
,7 See note 3 supra. See also, S. REP. No. 76zz, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44. (954).
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